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S. - v. S. - establishes that a guardian ad litem must be appointed
to represent a minor child when his paternity is an issue. This requirement
is a step forward. It recognizes that the interests of a child in a paternity
dispute are significant and helps to ensure that they are presented to the court.
Requiring a guardian ad litem in a wide range of cases represents an improvement over the case-by-case, result-oriented approach used by courts
before S.

-

v. S.

JAN ROBEY ALONZO

NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ABSENT
PHYSICAL IMPACT OR
SUBSEQUENT PHYSICAL INJURY
1
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals

As a member of the Kaiser Health Plan, Valerie Molien visited Kaiser
for a routine physical examination. After examination and testing, a Kaiser
staff physician concluded that she had contracted an infectious form of
syphilis. 2 She was instructed to advise her husband, Stephen, of the test
results. She subsequently underwent treatment for the disease, including
heavy doses of penicillin. Tests revealed that Stephen had not contracted
the disease. It was later discovered that the staff physician's diagnosis was
inaccurate-Valerie did not have syphilis. 3 In the meantime, the
misdiagnosis had caused her to become "upset and suspicious that...
[Stephen] had engaged in extramarital sexual activities; tension and hostility
arose between the two, 'causing a break-up of their marriage and the initiation of dissolution proceedings.' "4
Stephen sued Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and the diagnosing physician for negligent infliction of emotional distress5 and for loss of consortium.
He did not allege that he suffered any physical injury as a result of the emo1. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
2. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
3.

Id.

4. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
5. The court used the terms "mental" distress and "emotional" distress interchangeably. Although the court's holding refers to "emotional" distress, there
is no reason to believe that a cause of action framed in terms of "mental" distress
would be treated any differently. See Comment, Negligently InflictedMental Distress:
The CaseforanIndependent Tort, 59 GEO. LJ.1237, 1238 n.7 (1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Commentj (1965).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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tional distress. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. The
court of appeals affirmed 6 on the traditional basis that "[t]here can be no
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the absence of
physical injury." 7 The California Supreme Court reversed and held that
"a cause of action may be statd for the negligent infliction of serious emo8
tional distress" absent any physical impact or subsequent physical injury.
Although a variety of objections has been raised against allowing recovery
for mental or emotional distress, 9 the predominant fear seems to be "the
danger of vexatious suits and ficticious claims."10 As a result, various limitations have been imposed on mental and emotional distress claims to assure
the genuineness of the claim. One limitation is the "impact" rule. This rule
is followed in a minority of states," including Missouri.' 2 It requires that
the plaintiff suffer contemporaneous physical impact or injury accompanied
by the mental or emotional distress. 13 In the absence of any impact, recovery
6. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 96 Cal. App. 3d 469, 158 Cal. Rptr.
107 (1979), rev'd, 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
7. 96 Cal. App. 3d at 475, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
8. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at839. The court also
held that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for the loss of consortium based on
the mental suffering of the plaintiffs wife. Id. at 931, 616 P.2d at 821-23, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 839-41.
9. The main objections are as follows: (1) mental distress cannot be measured
in terms of money, (2) the physical consequences of mental distress are too remote,
(3) there is a lack of precedent, (4) a vast increase in mental distress claims would
result, and (5) there is a danger of vexatious suits and ficticious claims. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
436A, Comment b (1965).
10. W. PROSSER, supranote 9,

§ 54.

11. Id. at 331 n.64; Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply Ltd.: Redefining the Limits
to Recoveryfor Negligently InflictedMental Distress, 11 TULSA L.J. 587, 590 n. 12 (1976).
12. Oblatore v. Brauner, 283 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Williams v.
School Dist. of Springfield R-12, 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969); Langworthy v.
Pulitzer Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963).
Litigation arising out of the Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse in Kansas City,
Missouri, on July 17, 1981, see TIME, July 27, 1981, at 26, may result in a reexamination of Missouri's approach to recovery for negligent infliction of mental
distress. There have been suggestions that persons attending the tea dance at the
Hyatt at the time of the disaster may seek recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress, despite suffering no physical impact from the fallen skywalks.
13. E.g., Spade v. Lynn & B. R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (no
recovery for mental distress or physical injuries caused solely by such distress when
no injury to person from without); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107,
45 N.E. 354 (1896) (plaintiff denied recovery for fright and subsequent miscarriage
caused by uncontrolled team ofhorses because no immediate personal injury); Zelinski v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) (jostling of occupants
of automobile in collison found to be sufficient impact to allow recovery for emohttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/27
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is denied. 14 In some cases, however, the impact requirement has been
satisfied by very minor contacts, even though the impact itself caused no
real harm. 15 One frequently cited case found smoke
inhalation a sufficient
16
impact to allow recovery for mental distress.
Absent physical impact, many courts nevertheless allow recovery if the
plaintiff has suffered physical harm as a consequence of the mental or emotional distress. 17 Echoing the rationale for the impact rule, these courts rely
on a physical manifestation of the psychic injury to screen out baseless
claims.' 8 Such cases generally arise in one of two situations. In the first situational distress). See generally Leibson, Recovery ofDamagesforEmotionalDistressCaused
by PhysicalInjury to Another, 15J. FAM. L. 163, 168-72 (1977); Simons, PsychicInjury
and the Bystander: The TranscontinentalDispute Between Californiaand New York, 51 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1976); Torts-Negligence-DirectImpactRule, 39 TEMP. L.Q.
229 (1966); 11 TULSA L.J., supra note 11, at 589-92.
14. See cases cited notes 12 & 13 supra. For a bristling criticism of the impact
rule, see Justice Musmanno's dissent in Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161, 183, 142
A.2d 263, 274 (1958) (Musmanno, J., dissenting). Pennsylvania later abandoned
the impact rule in Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). W.
PROSSER, supra note 9, at 332 (citing Bosley and Niederman), concluded that the impact rule is headed for rapid extinction.
15. See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680
(1928) (defendant's horse evacuated its bowels onto plaintiff's lap); McCardle v.
Peck Dry Goods Co., 271 Mo. 111, 195 S.W. 1034 (1917) (defective elevator struck
bottom of shaft with thud); Porter v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405,
63 A. 860 (1906) (dust from crash of railway bridge got into plaintiff's eyes).
16. See Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930).
17. See, e.g., Bowmanv. Williams, 164Md. 397, 165A. 182 (1933) (plaintiff
became very weak and nervous, remained in bed for two weeks, and unable to work
for six months); Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 235 N.W. 335 (1931) (plaintiff
suffered nervous prostration from threatened attack by defendant's dog); Falzone
v. Busch, 45 NJ. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (recovery may be had for substantial
bodily injury or sickness resulting from defendant's negligent operation of his
automobile if plaintiff in fear for own safety); Lambert v. Brewster, 97 W. Va. 124,
125 S.E. 244 (1924) (plaintiff suffered miscarriage as result of witnessing defendant assault and beat her father); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(1965).
Some courts have denied recovery for the physical consequences of mental
distress on the ground that the subsequent physical injury was not foreseeable. E.g.,
Justesen v. Pennsylvania R.R., 92 N.J.L. 257, 106 A. 137 (1919); Miller v.
Baltimore &O.S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908). See generallyHallen,
Damagesfor PhysicalInjuriesResulting From Frightor Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253, 253

(1933).
18. One of the major difficulties courts encounter with this approach is in
distinguishing a physical injury from a mental one. This distinction is, of course,
a crucial one since characterization of the injury as physical is necessary for recovery.
See, e.g., Sloane v. Southern Cal. Ry., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322 (1896);
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 104-05 (1959). This fine line between physical and mental

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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tion, the defendant may be liable to the plaintiff if his negligent act causes
mental or emotional distress that the defendant should have realized might
19
result in illness or bodily harm to the plaintiff. The threat of physical harm
is created solely by the mental or emotional distress; the plaintiff is not in
20
danger of an impact from some external force. The existence of the mental or emotional distress is important only because it involves a risk of bodily harm to the plaintiff. 21 Additionally, if no bodily harm actually results,
22
there can be no recovery for the mental or emotional distress alone.
The other situation arises in "close call" occurrences when an exter23
nal force places the plaintiff in fear for his own safety. The theory followed
rule.2 4
by many courts in this situation has been labeled the "zone of danger"
injuries has resulted in confusion regarding the proper classification of certain injuries. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1241 n.24 & 1259 n.128 (citing, inter alia,
Cosgrove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965), in which physical manifestations such as dizziness, mild headache, and nervousness were not considered bodily
harm). Advancements in medical science have caused courts and scholars to examine critically the medical aspects of mental and emotional distress. See Leong
v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 411-13, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67 (1974); Simons, supra
note 13, at 26 n.112; Comment, supra note 5, at 1248-62.
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 306,312, 313, 436(1) (1965). See
cases cited note 20 infra.
20. E.g., Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843
(1952) (plaintiff given baby other than one born to her, but recovery denied because
of absence of resulting physical injury); Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn.
301, 306, 93 A.2d 292, 294 (1952) (seller of water heater negligently sent his
employees to home of nondefaulting buyer to remove heater); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 306, Comment a, 313, Comment b (1965).
21. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFTORTS §§306, Commentb, 312, Comment
a, 313, Comment a, 436, Comment 1 (1965).
22. See authorities cited note 21 supra. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §436A (1965). ButseeMontinieriv. Southern New Eng. Tel. Co., 175 Conn.
337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978).
23. See, e.g., Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 755,235 N.W. 335,337 (1931)
(plaintiff suffered physical injuries as result of mental shock inflicted when defendant's dog threatened to attack); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84
(1970) (plaintiff in fear for his own safety when defendant's car narrowly missed
him).
24. E.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295,379 P.2d
513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)); Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165
N.W.2d 259 (1969); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 247 N.E.2d 419, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2) (1965).
Some courts appear to apply the zone of danger rule, although they do not
specifically refer to it by that name. See, e.g., Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397,
165 A. 182 (1933); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/27
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Rather than requiring that the plaintiff be physically touched, the rule allows
recovery if the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger created by the
defendant's negligence and, at the same time, feared for his own safety. The
zone of danger test frequently is applied in bystander cases, such as when
a mother suffers mental or emotional distress with resulting physical injuries
2
after seeing her child struck by the defendant's car . 5
Under both the impact rule and those cases allowing recovery for physical
consequences, the recovery for the mental or emotional distress is viewed
as parasitic to the recovery for the physical injuries. 26 Courts generally have
not extended independent legal protection to mental or emotional suffer27
ing caused unintentionally.
In response to a deficiency in the zone of danger rule, the California
Supreme Court, in Dillon v. Legg, 28 expanded the scope of recovery for
bystanders. The Dillon court identified "foreseeability of the risk" as "the
chief element in determining whether [a] defendant owes a duty or an obligation to [the] plaintiff." 29 Thus, the plaintiff in Dillon, the mother of a child
killed by the defendant's car, was allowed to proceed to trial on her claim
for emotional disturbance and shock and accompanying physical injuries,
30
despite absence from the zone of physical danger.
Finally, courts, including Missouri,3 1 have recognized that intentional
infliction of mental or emotional distress is an independent cause of action. 32
25. E.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel& Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d
513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d
912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968)); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W.
497 (1935). Cf. Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978)
(recovery allowed even though mother did not witness school bus strike child, but
arrived at accident scene shortly thereafter and saw daughter lying injured on
ground).
26. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 54, at330; Magruder, Mentaland Emotional
Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1048 (1936).
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965). In two groups of
cases, however, the negligent transmission of telegraph messages, such as one announcing death, and the negligent handling of corpses, courts have allowed recovery
for mental distress. See W. PROSSER, supranote 9, § 54, at 329-30. These cases are
unique, however, because the negligent act involved provided a very high degree
of reliability that the plaintiffs suffered genuine mental distress.
28. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
29. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
30. See notes 54-58 and accompanying text infra.
31. Warrem v. Parrish, 436 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. 1969); Pretsky v. Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 396 S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1965).
32. E.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d
282 (1952) (threats of physical harm and of harm to plaintiffs business); Turman
v. Central Billing Bureau, Inc., 279 Or. 443, 568 P.2d 1382 (1977) (collection agent
made repeated badgering telephone calls and referred to plaintiff, a blind woman,
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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This cause of action is reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts section
46. Recovery under this theory requires that the defendant intentionally or
recklessly cause severe emotional distress by extreme and outrageous
conduct. 33 Neither contemporaneous physical impact nor resulting physical
34
consequences are necessary for recovery.
The significance of the court's holding in Molien is that a plaintiff may
state a cause of action for negligent infliction of serious mental or emotional
distress, even though he suffers neither a physical impact nor a subsequent
physical injury. 35 The standard adopted for proof of such an injury, however,
is unclear. The court said that it agreed with a decision of the Hawaii
Supreme Court, Rodrigues v. State.36 In relying on Rodrigues, the Molien court
stated, " '[T]he general standard of proof required to support a claim of
mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the
case.' "37
Molien's characterization of the Rodrigues standard was not entirely accurate. The standard enunciated in Rodrigues was that "serious mental
distress may be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would
be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case." 3 8 Perhaps the Molien court impliedly adopted this
reasonable man standard through its heavy reliance on Rodrigues.39 Nevertheless, this uncertainty could be confusing in future cases, particularly when
instructing the jury. Furthermore, the court chose not to specify the types
of suffering that constitute "serious" mental or emotional distress. 40 The
as "scum" and "deadbeat"); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344
(1961) (repeated and persistent solicitations for illicit sexual relations); W. PROSSER, supranote 9, § 12; Prosser, Insult andOutrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40(1956); Prosser, IntentionalInfliction ofMental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
33.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d (1965).

34. See, e.g., State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 338,
240 P.2d 282, 286 (1952); Curnutt v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 688, 57 N.W.2d 915,
918 (1953); Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 293, 358 P.2d 344, 346-47 (1961).
35. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. Subsequent California cases also have stated this to be the major significance ofMolien.
See Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 737, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435,
440 (1980); Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 648, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909
(1980).

36. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
37. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (quoting
Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii at 172, 472 P.2d at 520).
38. 52 Hawaii at 173, 472 P.2d at 520.
39. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text infra.
40. The court said that "a cause of action may be stated for the negligent infliction of serious emotional distress."27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 839 (emphasis added). Since the judge will determine whether the plainhttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/27
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task of defining the parameters of serious mental and emotional distress lies
with future court decisions.
In deciding Molien, the court relied heavily on Rodrigues.4 1 The plaintiffs in Rodrigues recovered money from the State of Hawaii for mental distress
suffered as a result of flood damage to their home. The state highway department was found negligent for failing to clear a blocked drainage culvert. The
result was an overflow of surface waters that flooded the plaintiffs' home
causing extensive damage to the house and furnishings. The plaintiffs,
however, suffered no bodily harm.4 2 In recognizing the cause of action for
mental distress, the Hawaii court said, "We recognize that the interest in
freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protection. We hold, therefore, that there is a duty to refrain
from the negligent infliction of serious mental distress." 4 3 Although it appears that Hawaii recognized the Molien approach to mental distress ten years
prior, Rodrigues is distinguishable on the facts. The plaintiffs in Rodrigues also
recovered money for the property damage to their home-a home they had
waited fifteen years to build.4 4 Therefore, although the court's language is
couched in terms of affording mental distress "independent legal protection," the recovery could be viewed as parasitic to the property damage,
with the property damage serving as the guarantee that the mental distress
claim was genuine. 45 This fact situation is significantly different from that
in Molien, in which the emotional distress claim truly was an independent
46
cause of action.
tiff has stated a cause of action, it follows that the judge, not the jury, will determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded "serious" emotional distress. A mere recital
in the complaint that the plaintiff has suffered "serious emotional distress" will not
suffice; he also must plead facts sufficient to satisfy the judge that his claim is a
serious one. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.10(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981). The
lack of guidance by the court on this point could result in a number of claims being
thrown out before they reach the jury. Only after the judge has found that a cause
of action exists will a jury decide whether the plaintiff has suffered the mental or
emotional distress he claims to have suffered.
41. 27 Cal. 3d at 927-30, 616 P.2d at 819-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 837-39.
42. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 169-73, 472 P.2d 509, 518-20 (1970).
43. Id. at 174, 472 P.2d at 520.
44. Id. at 157, 472 P.2d at 513.
45. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433-34, 426 P.2d 173, 179,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967) ("We are satisfied that a plaintiff who as a result of
a defendant's tortious conduct loses his property and suffers mental distress may
recover not only for the pecuniary loss but also for his mental distress."). Accord,
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122 Cal. Rptr. 470
(1975). See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 1070, 1078-90 (1953) (recovery for mental shock or distress in connection with injury to or interference with realty).
46. Although the plaintiff stated a cause of action for loss of consortium, the
court did not view the emotional distress claim as parasitic to recovery for loss of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
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Considering the court's heavy reliance on Rodrigues, it is interesting that
the court did not discuss Leong v. Takasaki,4 7 another major and more recent Hawaii decision on mental distress. 4 8 The sole cause of action in Leong

was a claim for damages "for nervous shock and psychic injuries suffered
without accompanying physical impact or resulting physical consequences
or manifestations thereof, when... [the plaintiff] witnessed his stepgrandmother ... being struck and killed by" the defendant's automobile.4 9 In
holding that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action, 50 the court said that
"the requirement of resulting physical injury, like the requirement of physical
impact, should not stand as another artificial bar to recovery, but merely
be admissible as evidence of the degree of mental or emotional distress
suffered.'"-1 Although Leong was a bystander case, nothing in the language
of the decision limited its holding to such cases. The Hawaii court's willingness to allow recovery by a bystander for mental distress in the absence
of both contemporaneous and subsequent physical injury should make the
same recovery available to one who is the direct victim of the defendant's
negligent act. 52 Consequently, Leong may have been the true forerunner to
Molien and perhaps would have formed a more solid basis for the court's
holding than Rodrigues.
Perhaps the court's reluctance to rely on Leong stemmed from its
characterization of the plaintiff as a direct victim of the negligent diagnosis
rather than as a bystander.5 3 This distinction was crucial to recovery by the
plaintiff. Had the court treated him as a bystander, the three guidelines for
bystander recovery laid down in Dillon v. Legg5 4 would have precluded
recovery.
The plaintiffs in Dillon, the mother and sister of a deceased child,
witnessed the defendant's car strike and kill the child. The trial court
recognized that the sister had a cause of action for emotional shock and
resulting physical injuries because she may have been in the zone of physical
danger at the time of the accident.5 5 The trial court denied recovery to the
consortium. Even if the plaintiff's emotional distress claim were viewed as parasitic
to the loss of consortium claim, the court's abandonment of the physical consequences requirement would remain untarnished. The loss of consortium claim also
was based on emotional distress to the wife without any resulting physical injuries.
27 Cal. 3d at 931-33, 616 P.2d at 821-23, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839-41.
47. 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974).
48. The next major Hawaii decision on mental distress after Leong was Kelley
v. Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975).
49. 55 Hawaii at 399, 520 P.2d at 760.
50. Id. at 413, 520 P.2d at 767.
51. Id. at 403, 520 P.2d at 762.
52. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.

53.

27 Cal. 3d at 923, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.

54.
55.

68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/27
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mother, however, because she was not in the zone of physical danger,
although she was just a short distance away. 56 The California Supreme Court
found such a result anomalous and allowed the mother to proceed to trial
on the basis that her emotional shock was a foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. 5 7 The Dillon court said that similar cases should be guided by three factors: whether the plaintiff was located near the accident scene,
whether the plaintiff observed the accident, and whether there existed a close
58
relationship between the plaintiff and the victim.
When Dillon was decided, the court expressly confined its holding to cases
in which the plaintiff suffered a physical injury as a result of the emotional
shock.5 9 Because the Molien court painstakingly distinguished Dillon,60 the
question arises whether bystander recovery for emotional distress under Dillon
still requires a resulting physical injury. 61 The Molien court used very broad
language to discard the requirement of resulting physical injury. 62 Although
not specifically stating so, it seems inherent in the court's opinion that the
absence of a physical injury should not bar a claim for mental or emotional
63
distress, even in a bystander case.
Both Rodrigues and Leong may be read as recognizing an independent
cause of action for negligent infliction of mental distress without any
manifesting physical injury. Molien, however, is the first case which squarely
holds that a direct victim of a negligent act may recover solely for mental
or emotional suffering. 64 In so doing, the California Supreme Court has re66
jected limitations 65 that have been criticized as arbitrary and artificial.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 747, 441 P.2d at 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
58. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
59. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
60. 27 Cal. 3d at 922-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
61. Prosser suggests that resulting physical harm should remain a requirement
for bystander recovery. Although he states that such a requirement admittedly is
arbitrary, he indicates that it would be necessary to protect potential defendants
from undue liability. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 54, at 335.
62. 27 Cal. 3d at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838-39 ("In
our view the attempted distinction between physical and psychological injury merely
clouds the issue. The essential question is one of proof; whether the plaintiff has
suffered a serious and compensable injury should not turn on this artificial and often
arbitrary classification scheme.").
63. The three Dillon guidelines for bystander recovery, see note 58 and accompanying text supra, will remain intact. See Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.
App. 3d 728, 737, 160 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440 (1980); Cortezv. Macias, 110 Cal. App.
3d 640, 648-49, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909 (1980). The effect ofMolien on Dillon would
be to remove the resulting physical injury requirement from bystander recovery.
64. 27 Cal. 3d at 930, 616 P.2d at 821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
65.' See notes 9-34 and accompanying text supra.
66. See Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 403-05, 520 P.2d 758, 766-67
(1974); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 171-74, 472 P.2d 509, 518-21 (1970);
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